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. Those are probably the main channels through which freight rates are impacted by maritime piracy. However, the lack of systematic data on insurance contracts 2 , salaries paid by ship-owners, the proportion of ships re-routed, the investment in defense measures and poor data on freight rates made difficult to implement any comprehensive study of the impact of piracy on transport cost. This is an important caveat given that in a world of decreasing trade barriers related to custom duties and tariffs; transport cost have become one of the main obstacles to international trade (Hummels, 2001 ).
As piracy acts occurs mainly on the Euro-Asia maritime trade route, higher freight rates may hinder trade between these two continents. Increasing transport prices might also reinforce the idea, put forward by the shipping industry, to develop a north trade route between Europe and
1 The most important shipping companies, CMA-CGM, MSC and Maersk have announced in 2009 they would divert some of their lines through the Cape route (Times 2008 , Port Strategy 2009 . The Indian shipping association has declared that depending upon the size, war risk premium for merchant vessels sailing in Indian Ocean has gone up from $500 per ship and per voyage to up to $150,000 per ship and per voyage (Financial Express, 2011) . Shipping companies as Interoient Line Services have considered hiring private security service companies costing US$60000 per trip (Miller, 2008) . 2 See Ploch et al. (2010) for more information on the problems linked to insurance, notably the fact that US shipowners do not have to insure themselves against the risk of war.
Asia passing through the Artic region. This development could have heavy consequences in terms of environmental costs and on the economies currently benefiting from their position on the current route between Europe and Asia as Egypt or Singapore.
This paper aims to fulfill some of the abovementioned gaps in the literature by testing the effect of modern maritime piracy on maritime trade cost. We propose a simple model of transport cost determination and derive a transport costs equation augmented with maritime piracy as an additional explanatory variable. To our knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on unitary transport costs as response variable. We overcome the major hurdle of data availability by using a new database on maritime transport cost developed by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and data on modern maritime piracy obtained from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The sectoral information provided in the maritime transport cost database allows us to test whether pirates attack more ships transporting certain type of goods 3 .
Our findings show a significant and positive impact of maritime piracy on maritime transport cost. One additional ship hijacked results in 1.2% increase in maritime transport costs between Europe and Asia. These results maybe of importance for policy makers interested in the relative position of Euro-Asian trade compared to USA-Asian trade. In particular, we show that localized conflicts could harm selectively some international trade routes.
This paper is organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the literature on maritime piracy and transport cost. Section 3 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the model specification and empirical estimation and section 5 presents the main results.
Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
2-MARITIME PIRACY AND TRANSPORT COST
Our paper brings together two different strands of the economic literature: whereas the first one analyzes the economic aspects of modern maritime piracy, the second focuses on the determinants of international transport cost.
Modern maritime piracy and international trade
A number of international trade economists have modeled the impact of adverse conditions, such as insecurity, conflicts and terrorism, on international trade Marcouiller, 2002 and Mirza and Verdier, 2008) . Maritime piracy has also been specifically linked to trade. In particular, Bendal (2010) and Fu et al (2010) focus on the economic impact of maritime piracy on trade through the decision of ship operators to change their main trade routes between Europe and Asia in order to avoid Somali piracy. Moreover, Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso (2011) evaluate the impact of maritime piracy on the volume of trade between European and Asiatic countries. In this line of study we aim to extend this research by analyzing the effect of maritime piracy on the price of maritime transport.
We also contribute to the ongoing debate in the scientific community on the motivations and the methods used by pirates. Some scholars sustain that pirates are not choosing their prey according to the shipment transported by the vessel (Mejia and al, 2009 ), but tend to avoid attacking ships flying the colors of countries having military presence in their close vicinity (Kiourktsoglou and Coutroubis, 2010) . Another view supported by Hastings (2009) is that pirates choose their targets according to the value on the black market of the shipment transported. He indicates that Somali and Malaccan pirates show a different behavior. Whereas Somali pirates are mostly interested in the expected ransom they will receive for the ship and the crew, Malaccan pirates are mostly interested in selling back rapidly their loots. The main reason for the latter behavior is the pressure put by the authorities around them and the possibilities that a particular region offers to sell back the lootings done. However, the fact that the Malaccan pirates care about the shipments of the vessels they attack does not mean that they will systematically prey on the same sort of merchandises. Our paper gives some support to the first argument, namely pirates are not concern with the type of good transported, by showing that at least within broadly defined goods categories this is not the case.
The determinants of transport cost
For many years international trade economists have been using the iceberg transport cost 4 formulation as an analytical devise that greatly simplify trade analysis. However, the explicit iceberg assumption is not observational or empirical. Indeed, in reality transport cost per tone is not invariant with respect to the tonnage of material deliver. In applied work, distance has been used for many years in gravity models of trade as a proxy for transport costs, assuming that transport cost is an increasing function of distance between the trading countries. However distance remains an unsatisfactory measure of trade cost because it is time unvaried and independent of the tonnage of transported goods. It has been only in the last two decades that more sophisticated ways have been used to measure transport cost and to analyze its impact on international trade. In the early 2000, Limao and Venables (2001) and Micco and Perez (2001) added infrastructure variables to gravity equations to better characterize the impact of transport costs on trade. A second wave of research emphasized that transport costs is indeed endogenously determined (Martinez Zarzoso and Suarez Burguet, 2005; Martinez Zarzoso and Wilsmeier, 2007; Korinek and Sourdin, 2009ab Finally, it is worth mentioning that it is outside the scope of the paper to investigate the channels through which piracy affects transport costs using statistical methods. As mentioned in the introduction we only found anecdotal evidence showing that sailors' salaries and insurance cost have increased as a consequence of maritime piracy. Indeed we did not find comprehensive data on neither insurance premia nor sailors' salaries. In addition, differences between the various types of insurances across countries made difficult any comparison. For example a federal program, the U.S Maritime War Risk Insurance Program covers for the additional risk of maritime piracy directed against U.S vessels (Ploch et al. 2010) Concerning the use of the Cape Route it is particularly difficult to have a clear evaluation of the number of ships being effectively re-routed. It is hard to believe that the re-routing of the ships through the Cape may be a safe solution for most of the maritime commercial traffic as the activities of Somali pirates expanded to the north of Madagascar and Mauritius Island (see Figure 1 ). Finally, shipping companies are particularly secretive when it comes to the measures they used to defend their ships. For neither of these variables, we find satisfying proxies to be used in our study.
MARITIME PIRACY AND TRANSPORT COSTS: THE CURRENT SITUATION

Geography of maritime trade and piracy
The surfacing of maritime piracy depends on the existence of advantageous geographical conditions, namely narrow straits to spot future preys, islets or coastal areas remote enough to escape any form of authorities (Murphy, 2008; Ong-Webb, 2007) . Not only geographical conditions are important, but also the geo-economic and political context of the countries suitably located to host piracy. Maritime piracy could indeed take roots when intensively used maritime trade routes pass in the vicinity of potential pirates' harbors located in failed or weak states. Nowadays, the two main maritime piracy hot spots, the Malacca straits and the Gulf of Aden, show these favorable conditions. The Malaccan piracy was more intense in the late nineties; whereas Somali piracy plays today the leading role. These two hot spots of maritime piracy are located on the trade routes linking Asia to Europe.
In order to examine the extent of the problem posed by piracy to shipping between Europe and Asia, we rely on a similar strategy as in Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso ( 
Figure 1. Maritime Regions
A ship heading from a port in northern Europe to China must cross all five maritime regions;
four if it ends its journey in Singapore and three if it unloads its shipment in Mumbai (see Table   A . 1 
Figure 2. Evolution of average transport freight rates for two alternative routes
We differentiate between three kinds of incidents according to the extent to which the ship's journey is disrupted: Attempted acts of piracy, boarding acts and hijackings. An attempted piracy act occurs when pirates board a ship and abandon it empty-handed after being discovered, or in instances in which a ship is fired upon without being stopped. Instances of boarding entail actual boarding of a ship by pirates and theft (generally the personal belongings of the crew and/or goods carried for crew maintenance and en-route ship repairs). These incidents may involve violence against the crew. The last type of piracy act, hijacking, consists in the seizure of the ship and its crew, the immobilization of the ship in a coastal area under the control of the pirates and a ransom being demanded in exchange for the crew members, the ship and its cargo. It is most obviously hijackings that are the most disruptive for maritime trade. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the three types of piracy incidents over time between Europe and East Asia. 
MEASUREMENT OF TRANSPORT COSTS
One of the main difficulties in analyzing transport costs is that of obtaining reliable data. In the recent economic literature there have been several attempts to measure directly or indirectly transport costs. Some authors used cif/fob ratios as a proxy for shipping costs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001, Limao and Venables, 2001; Radelet and Sachs, 1998) . Since most importing countries report trade flows inclusive of freight and insurance (cif) and exporting countries report trade flows exclusive of freight and insurance (fob), transport costs can be calculated as the difference of both flows for the same aggregate trade. However, Hummels (1999b) showed that importer cif/fob ratios constructed from IMF sources are poor proxies for cross-sectional variation in transport costs and such variable provides no information about changes in transport costs over time. Oguledo and Mcphee (1994) also doubted the usefulness of cif/fob ratios from IMF sources as a proxy of transportation costs.
Several authors have attempted to construct more accurate measures of transport costs. Hummels International, Drewry Consulting and the Baltic Dry Shipping Index). A sound methodology is used to harmonize these various sets of observations (Korinek, 2008) . The advantages of this database in terms of comprehensiveness and time span make it a valuable tool for the study of transport costs (Korinek and Sourdin, 2009a; Korinek and Sourdin 2009b) . Figure 4 displays the evolution of the average unit transport cost for four categories of goods (manufactured goods, dirty bulk, crude oil and agricultural goods) exported from Europe (EU15) to Asia. 
FACTORS EXPLAINING TRANSPORT COSTS
Model specification
A general formulation of transport costs for commodity k shipped between countries i and j, in a given period of time, can be written as:
where X it and X jt are country specific characteristics, v ijt is a vector of characteristics related to the journey between i and j, ω k is a product specific effect that captures differences in transport demand elasticity across goods, μ ij represents unobservable heterogeneity that is specific to each trading flow and φ t unobservable heterogeneity that is time-specific.
GDP and population of the trading countries are used to proxy for country specific characteristics, such as infrastructure and quality of institutions Assuming a multiplicative form, a transport cost function is specified as:
where TC ijkt denotes unitary maritime transport cost for each 2-digit HS product category, i denotes the importer country, j denotes the exporter country and t the year, k is the 2-digit level of the HS classification. Y denotes the GPD of the corresponding country, Pop denotes population. Imb is the trade imbalance between country i and j calculated as the difference between exports from i to j and imports of i from j in absolute value. XM denotes trade volumes in tons calculated as the sum of exports and imports, Hijack rt denotes the number of piracy incidents involving hijacking along the trade route r in year t linking country i and j. Other type of piracy incidents (boarded ships and attempted attacks) will also be considered as explanatory variables. μ ij , ω k and φ t denote the different sets of fixed effects described above. Finally, ε ijkt is the error term that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed.
Taking natural logarithms of equation (2) we obtain a linear version of the general specification given by, where ln denotes natural logarithms and all the variables have been described after equation (2).
Data and variables
In this section we describe the data and variables used in our empirical work. Sources and variable definitions are listed in Table A An alternative variable that could be used instead of piracy events is The Lloyd's classification of a war zone. In Table A .3 we show the evolution of the different zones reported through the last 6 reports of Joint War Committee available on line. We would like to underline that for most of the observations, when a country is listed the war zone concerns the limits of the national waters of this country. This definition, pertinent and useful when a war occurred and the insurance companies require a strict defined geographical perimeter, seems to us limitative in order to grasp the piracy phenomena. With the only exception of thieves in ports, the pirates' attacks occur en route. It is true that most of these attacks take place not far from a coastal area but nonetheless pirates do not feel bound by the territorial limits defined internationally (particularly in the zones were several national maritime zone are in contact or very close as in the Gulf of Aden or the Strait of Malacca). The joint war committee has tackled this problem by defining broader zone of danger (Gulf of Aden, Sulu Archipelago). In this instance, the Gulf of Aden zone juxtaposes quasi perfectly with the Red Sea Gulf of Aden maritime zone defined in our paper. Even if similar zones are defined the war zone classification presents the important disadvantages of not revealing any information on the intensity of the conflict and of presenting very few variations over time. By providing a count of the number of incidents over time for each geographic zone and trade route defined, the IMB database, in our sense, was more suitable for the type of study we aimed to do.
Empirical application and main results
Main results
Equation (3) has been estimated using a least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDV) with different sets of dummies to control for unobservable heterogeneity. To test whether piracy acts have different impacts on transport costs depending on the nature of transported goods, we estimate Equation (3) for four different types of goods (agriculture, manufactures, raw materials and crude oil) and for two different types of transport (containers and tankers and dirty bulk). . The baseline estimation results are shown in Table 2 (LSDV estimates). In Table 3 , we estimate Equation (3) with the variables t_hijack and t_boarded lagged two years 8 . In doing so, we control for the possibility that shipping contracts are agreed upon in advance. The estimated coefficients for the different sets of fixed effects (k, ij, t) are not shown 9 .
Both Tables report the results assuming common coefficients for all types of products in the first column and specific estimates for four different types of goods, namely manufactures, agricultural goods, raw materials and crude oil in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
[ Table 2 ,3]
In both estimations (LSDV and LSDV with lagged piracy variables) the piracy coefficients have the expected positive signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels for total trade, manufactures and agricultural products. The coefficients in Table 3 are slightly higher for t_hijack for total trade, manufactures and agricultural products and turn out to be also positive and significant for raw materials and crude oil. One additional hijacked ship results in an increase of around 1.6 percent ( Table 3 , column 1) of maritime transport costs between Europe and Asia. A positive and significant effect is also found for manufactures and agricultural goods considered separately in both specifications and for raw materials and crude oil only using lagged values of piracy incidents. One additional act of hijacking results in an increase of around 1.5 percent and 1.4 percent of maritime transport costs for manufactured goods and agricultural goods respectively. When considering boarded ships as piracy acts, the impact on transport costs 7 Attempted attacks was also originally considered but it was not statistically significant and it is not included in the final estimations. 8 We thank the suggestion made by one anonymous referee. Similar results obtained with the variable lagged one period are available upon request. 9 These results are available upon request from the authors.
is lower but also shows a positive and statistically significant effect for all categories of goods in Table 2 and for the two main categories (agricultural and manufacturing products) in Table 3 .
According to our data, the unit maritime transport cost of footwear was 0.505 US$ in 2007 that for a shipment of 10000 units of footwear between Europe and Asia amounts to 5050 US$. One more act of hijacking translates into an increase of 75.75 US$ for the shipment. Furthermore, if
we also consider the number of piracy acts resulting in the successful boarding of a ship, the increase in transport costs will be of 96 US$. The coefficient on the variable t_boarded is not statistically significant for raw materials and for crude oil when used lagged values (Table 3, columns 4 and 5). However for these two categories of goods the number of observations available is very low in comparison with manufactures and agricultural products. This is probably the reason why the results are less robust to changes in the specification.
Robustness check
We mentioned that there is a certain level of controversy in the scientific community concerning the fact that pirates may choose the ships they attacked according to the good transported. Since transport costs depend on the nature of transported goods, the piracy variable in Equation (3) might be endogenous. As a robustness check we estimate Equation (3) for ships transporting containers on one side and for tankers and ships transporting dirty bulk on the other side. Tankers are one of the main categories of ships under attack according to the ICC database (see Table   A .4). However, it seems that very few attacks on this kind of vessels are successful and result in hijacking. Among the 30 attacks on oil tankers in 2008 only one has been successful 10 . Among the observations in our dataset, crude oil is transported by tanker but also by dirty bulks ships.
10 The successful attack of the Sirius Star a new launch Saudi Arabian super tanker made the top of the news for several weeks during 2008. It has been ever since the biggest ship captured by Somali pirates.
Therefore we have aggregated these two categories. The results are shown in Table 4 and indicate that the impact of piracy is greater for tankers and ships transporting dirty bulk.
We tried also several sets of instruments and finally instrumented the number of vessels hijacked with the number of hijacks in the three previous years. The model is estimated using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. We also tried with ship boarding and boarding attempts as instruments, but the variables are correlated with the number of vessels hijacked and are not independent of the type of transported goods and thus correlated with the error term in our transport cost equation.
The results of the IV estimation when a GMM approach is taken are reported in Table 5 for all goods (colum 1) for manufactures (column 2) and for agriculture (column 3). We were not able to find valid instruments for crude oil and raw materials. Our variable of interest stays positive and significant and the magnitude is similar to the one obtained in Table 3 . It is worth noting that although widely use in the empirical literature, the use of internal instrument may not the best strategy. We leave this issue for further research.
[ In addition, the increase of transport costs due to maritime piracy could lead to some shipping companies to exploit the Artic route between Europe and Asia passing along the coasts of Russia. The route has been free of ice for at least three years from the end of August to the beginning of October. Without the cost of employing ice breaker ships to escort commercial vessels, the route has been demonstrated as more economical than the Suez route (Xu et al. 2011) . Adding the price of maritime piracy to the Suez route, the north route, at least for some months, become an interesting and safe alternative.
Until now, the various military operations put in place in the Gulf of Aden and in particular the operation Atalanta of the European Union have not succeeded to curb down the occurrence of piracy incidents, but it has forced the pirates to extend their range of action. It is only by reducing significantly the number of hijacking that the European navies could transfer the supplementary cost to ship merchandizes from private shipping companies and consumers to national governments and taxpayers. Future research should be directed towards determining the loss of welfare and the markets distortions associated with each of these two options.
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